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has focused on how oppositional activists leverage new digital tools. By contrast, 
still, relatively little is known about how authoritarian elites proactively deploy 
digital technologies to legitimize their rule. This article contributes to filling this 
gap by scrutinizing one highly innovative tactic that has recently been adopted 
repeatedly by Russia’s ruling elites: the organization of ‘Internet votes’ to staff 
advisory bodies to the government. In contrast to online petitions, online votes 
are aimed at aggregating citizen preferences not on issues but on candidates, that 
is, on individuals who later act as political representatives. The article presents an 
in-depth case study of the first such Internet vote conducted in Russia in 2012. It 
concludes that ruling elites deployed the tool swiftly to (1) disempower oppositional 
activists and (2) convey to the mass public the image of a transparent, accountable 
and responsive government.
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Over the past decade, a vibrant body of academic literature has emerged on the political 
consequences of the Internet for non-democratic politics. However, as a number of 
scholars have recently lamented (Greitens, 2013; Gunitsky, 2015; Oates, 2013; Pearce, 
2015; Renz and Sullivan, 2013), this research has largely focused on either (1) how 
oppositional activists leverage new digital tools to challenge authoritarian rule or (2) 
how authoritarian elites suppress and censor online dissent. By contrast, there has been 
relatively ‘little discussion of how states actively use the internet to expand their com-
municative power’ (Oates, 2013: 7; Greitens, 2013). This gap in research is particularly 
unfortunate since political scientists have recently highlighted the key role that quasi-
democratic ‘institutions for political participation’ play in the unexpected ‘resilience’ of 
contemporary authoritarian regimes (Nathan, 2003: 7; see also He and Thogersen, 2010; 
He and Warren, 2011; Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015; Truex, 2014). In this context, even 
consideration of the emergence of new types of ‘consultative’ or ‘deliberative’ authori-
tarian regimes has been suggested (He and Warren, 2011: 273).
This article seeks to contribute to filling this gap by placing under close scrutiny one 
highly innovative, digitally enabled strategy that has recently and repeatedly been 
adopted by Russia’s ruling elites: the organization of ‘Internet votes’ to staff advisory 
bodies to the authoritarian government. By ‘Internet votes’, I intend in this study specifi-
cally the online aggregation of citizen preferences for candidates to staff political bodies 
performing administrative or advisory functions. In contrast to the more widely scruti-
nized participatory tools of online petitions or polls (Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang and Xu, 
2009), Internet ‘votes’ are thus aimed at the aggregation of preferences, not on issues but 
on candidates, that is, on human beings who then act as political representatives. In con-
trast to traditional elections (for the role of elections under authoritarian rule, consider 
He and Warren, 2011; Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015; for experiments with e-voting in 
authoritarian contexts, consider Yard, 2010), Internet votes are not directed at appointing 
the highest legislative, judicative or executive organs of state, but at staffing advisory or 
administrative bodies. They are merely a participatory tool. Internet votes, so defined, 
have been initiated by the Russian regime since 2012 to fill positions in a wide range of 
advisory bodies to the government, including the Civic Chamber of the Russian 
Federation (BBC.com, 20141), the Expert Council to the Government of the Russian 
Federation (Open.gov.ru, 2015a1), the Public Council of the Ministry of Health (Medpro.
ru, 20131) and the Public Chambers of the Municipal Divisions of the Moscow Federal 
District (Perezagruzkaopmo.rf, 20141).
Despite their repeated adoption by the Russian regime, Internet votes as a new partici-
patory tool have not yet been scrutinized in extant research on the consequences of the 
Internet for authoritarian politics (for overviews of this literature, consider Greitens, 
2013; Gunitsky, 2015; He and Warren, 2011; Pearce, 2015). The key research questions 
that this exploratory study puts forth can be formulated as follows: Have the Internet 
votes recently held in Russia actually empowered oppositional forces, or have they 
instead played into the hands of the country’s ruling elites? And, if the latter is the case, 
then why and how can Internet votes – as seemingly inherently democratic participatory 
mechanisms – contribute to the stabilization of authoritarian rule? In order to answer 
these questions, this article adopts a single ‘revelatory case’ (Yin, 2014: 52) study design. 
To be specific, it scrutinizes the case of the first such Internet vote initiated by the 
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Kremlin, in summer 2012. This vote was aimed at appointing new members to a high-
profile advisory body, the President’s Council on the Development of Civil Society and 
Human Rights (PCHR, Sovet pri Presidente RF po razvitiyu grazhdanskogo obshchestva 
i pravam cheloveka). It was conducted between 1 and 15 September 2012 on the 
Council’s website, with every user entitled to support each of the 83 candidates with a 
maximum of one vote. According to official data, 108,000 citizens visited the site and 
cast 420,000 votes (PCHR, 2012d). A list of the 39 most-voted-for candidates was later 
presented to President Vladimir Putin, who decided, allegedly spontaneously, to appoint 
all 39 candidates on the list and thus expand the Council from the previous 30 to nearly 
70 members.
With regard to the methods of data collection, the analysis is grounded in extensive 
document analysis of mass media reports, government documents, think tank papers and 
social media accounts of activists.1 These documentary data were supplemented with 
additional information generated from personal interviews with two Russian experts and 
four key participants.1 By drawing on these data, the analysis concludes that the opening 
of the voting website as an online participatory space was swiftly deployed by Russia’s 
ruling elites (1) to disempower a group of widely respected oppositional activists who 
had previously served on the Council and to (2) convey to the mass public the image of 
transparent, accountable, and responsive government. In order to flesh out this line of 
argumentation, the remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section 
reviews the extant literature on consultative authoritarianism as a regime type and on 
authoritarian elites’ proactive use of new digital participatory tools. The subsequent sec-
tion provides background information on the functioning of the PCHR as a co-opted 
advisory council within Russia’s consultative authoritarian regime. A further section on 
methods is then followed by a section presenting the findings of the case analysis. The 
final part discusses the specifics of Internet votes as a novel addition to the repertoire of 
digital participatory tactics available to authoritarian leaders in the 21st century.
Consultative authoritarianism: functions and risks of 
authoritarian institutions
Since the end of the Cold War, authoritarian regimes across the globe have been increas-
ingly adopting a broad range of participatory institutions that are typically associated 
with democracies, including elections, parliaments, parties, consultative forums and 
deliberative assemblies (He and Warren, 2011; Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015; Levitsky and 
Way, 2010). However, even though these institutions do now formally operate within 
many authoritarian regimes, they usually function ‘at the discretion of rulers and their 
supporting elites’ (Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015: 278). These empirical observations have 
sparked an intense debate within the discipline of political science on the question of 
how to conceptualize new forms of authoritarian rule. Scholars have proposed, for 
instance, new types of ‘competitive’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010), ‘deliberative’ (He and 
Warren, 2011) and ‘consultative’ (He and Warren, 2011; Truex, 2014) authoritarianism. 
In this context, the concept of consultative authoritarianism (He and Warren, 2011; 
Truex, 2014) has been specifically deployed to emphasize, and scrutinize, how authori-
tarian regimes have started to vigorously encourage controlled forms of citizen input. He 
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and Warren (2011), for instance, have defined consultative authoritarianism as ‘a form of 
rule in which power holders use communication to collect the preferences of those their 
decisions will affect’ (p. 273). Unlike in democracies, however, citizen participation in 
consultative authoritarianism is not followed by decisions of democratically elected rep-
resentatives, but by decisions of unelected – or not competitively elected – rulers (He and 
Warren, 2011). In order to collect information from citizens, consultative authoritarian 
rulers typically create a broad range of ‘input institutions’ (Nathan, 2003: 14). In contem-
porary China, for instance, draft legislation is now routinely posted online for public 
comment, citizens and experts are invited to public legislative hearings and party and 
government agencies maintain offices for citizen complaints (He and Thogersen, 2010; 
He and Warren, 2011; Nathan, 2003). The authoritarian regimes of Singapore, Malaysia 
and Vietnam feature similar consultative elements (He and Warren, 2011).
Likewise, the Russia of the early 2010s could be considered an instance of an authori-
tarian polity adopting a broad spectrum of consultative tactics. Throughout the 2000s, the 
regime encouraged citizen participation via a variety of input institutions, including even 
regular, although not particularly competitive, elections at the national level (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010: 186–201). In 2011, however, these elections prompted a massive wave of 
street protests against alleged electoral fraud. Russia’s political elites reacted with a shift 
towards more ‘harsh authoritarianism’ (Shevtsova, 2015: 23). Important policy changes 
under way at the time of the Internet vote, scrutinized in this study, included a resolute 
campaign against recalcitrant non-government organizations (NGOs) and new limits on 
Internet content and foreign ownership of media companies (Shevtsova, 2015: 30–31). 
While the Russian authoritarian regime thus clearly restricted some forms and channels of 
citizen input, it continued, in contrast, to vigorously encourage others. Most remarkably, 
a high-profile initiative referred to as ‘Open Government’ (Otkrytoe pravitelstvo) aimed, 
according to its mission statement, to ‘secure the efficient co-operation between authori-
ties and society’ and to include ‘civil society and business in political decision-making’ 
(Open.gov.ru, 2015b1). This initiative featured, among others, programmes labelled as 
open data (Otkrytye dannye), open state purchasing (Otkrytye goszakupki), citizen budg-
ets (byudzhet dlya grazhdan), open state companies (Otkrytye goskompanii) and public 
councils (Obshchestvennye sovety) (Open.gov.ru, 2015b). At the time of research, the 
PCHR was thus only one among a flurry of public councils operating as input institutions 
within Russia’s consultative authoritarian regime – albeit one of the most prominent.
Why are such input institutions created by authoritarian elites? As He and Warren 
(2011) have argued with specific regard to deliberative practices, authoritarian elites are 
able to pursue at least five goals: (1) co-opting oppositional and pro-regime elites, (2) 
gathering information about society, (3) opening up forums for exchange with business 
elites, (4) credibly increasing transparency of government and (5) deflecting responsibil-
ity for unpopular decisions (for similar lists of functions, consider Lagacé and Gandhi, 
2015; Nathan, 2003; Truex, 2014). On a related note, Lagacé and Gandhi (2015) have 
argued that authoritarian elites are able to use participatory institutions in order to ‘man-
age their relations’ (p. 280) with four groups of actors: (1) pro-regime elites, (2) opposi-
tional elites, (3) ordinary citizens opposing the regime and (4) the mass public. However, 
while authoritarian elites may benefit from creating input institutions, there are also 
risks. The key dilemma is that institutions, in order to credibly fulfil their purposes, 
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necessarily also have to – at least to some degree – constrain the actions of ruling elites 
(He and Warren, 2011; Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015). Meaningful and credible elections, for 
instance, must imply at least a small chance that autocrats could lose them. Additional 
risks come with electoral fraud and manipulation, since the latter can ‘provide a focal 
point for the opposition and masses to rally around’ (Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015: 286).
Digital participatory tools deployed by authoritarian elites: 
three types
Partly by referring to this broader literature on authoritarian institutions, recent studies 
on the proactive use of digital technologies by authoritarian elites have scrutinized pri-
marily three types of participatory tools. The first type of online participatory space 
invites netizens to monitor the implementation of selected policies or lower-level offi-
cials (see, for example, Jiang and Xu, 2009; Noesselt, 2014; Toepfl, 2012). Key aims 
here are to make some areas of government more transparent, to increase levels of 
accountability among lower-level officials and to step up the efficiency of the bureau-
cracy. These goals were furthered, for instance, by the citizen complaint boxes that were 
in place on virtually all of the 31 Chinese provincial government portals scrutinized by 
Jiang and Xu (2009). On 61% of these portals, a high degree of activity was observed, 
that is, dozens of contributions ‘displayed online every month as a result of steady con-
tributions from users’ (Jiang and Xu, 2009: 179). With regard to Russia, it has been 
shown how citizen complaints on blogs (Toepfl, 2012) and the Twitter accounts of offi-
cials (Renz and Sullivan, 2013) can serve similar purposes.
A second type of online participatory space created by authoritarian elites encourages 
citizens to discuss planned policies and government measures, and even draft laws 
(Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang, 2010). Key functions of these spaces are to discover possible 
solutions to issue-specific problems and to gather information about the concerns of 
ordinary citizens and stakeholders. A primary example of this type of tool is the online 
consultation organized by the Chinese authorities with regard to a proposed revision of 
the health system (Balla, 2014; Balla and Liao, 2013). As Balla and Liao (2013) found, 
it was ‘common’ for the approximately 30,000 comments published on this platform ‘to 
address substantive issues in great depth, as well as express negative assessments of 
government decisions. This suggests that online consultation holds promise as an instru-
ment of governance reform’ (p. 101; for similar lines of argumentation with regard to 
Russia, see Renz and Sullivan, 2013; Toepfl, 2012).
Third, many authoritarian governments have opened up participatory spaces that 
aggregate citizen preferences on specific issues online (Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang and Xu, 
2009: 186). The key function of these tools is to gauge the intensity of support for, or 
resistance to, planned measures or policy changes. In 2007, for instance, more than 
80% of Chinese provincial government portals featured multiple-choice opinion 
polls, with approximately one-third of these portals regularly featuring this tool and 
with results displayed online (Jiang and Xu, 2009: 186). Within Russia’s relatively 
more open authoritarian system, the government even operated an online collective 
petitioning platform, launched in 2013 under the label ‘Russian Public Initiative’ 
(Gunitsky, 2015: 48).
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This study aims to extend this literature on how authoritarian elites adopt digital par-
ticipatory tools, primarily at two points. First, while a small body of research has scruti-
nized the three types of participatory spaces distinguished above (see, for instance, Balla 
and Liao, 2013; Jiang, 2010; Jiang and Xu, 2009; Truex, 2014), this is the first study of 
how authoritarian elites specifically deploy Internet votes as a novel participatory mech-
anism. Second, recent research of online participatory spaces in authoritarian contexts 
has largely relied on the content analysis of websites (Balla and Liao, 2013; Jiang and 
Xu, 2009) or on surveys of or experiments with citizens (Balla, 2012; Truex, 2014). By 
contrast, this study adopts the case-study method, grounding its findings in extensive 
document analysis and in-depth interviews with experts and key participants involved in 
the design of the participatory space. This approach facilitates the addressing of a distinct 
set of research questions, including, for instance, those regarding the motives and strate-
gies of key actors involved in the design and implementation of the participatory tool, or 
on the narratives about the participatory process as they are presented to the mass public 
via official, elite-controlled media. Before the case analysis is pursued, the next section 
provides some background knowledge about the PCHR.
The PCHR as an input institution within Russia’s 
consultative authoritarian regime
At the time of research, the PCHR played a highly ambiguous role within Russia’s 
consultative authoritarian regime. In organizational terms, the body of approximately 
30 members was part of the Presidential Administration. The president thus had the 
formal right to appoint whomever he wished to the Council. Typically, the president 
would invite both, pro-regime and sharply oppositional activists to work on the 
Council. In line with the literature on authoritarian institutions (Lagacé and Gandhi, 
2015; Nathan, 2003; Truex, 2014), the PCHR was thus arguably directed at serving at 
least three purposes for Russia’s ruling elites (Foreign Policy Centre, 2013; PCHR, 
20141). First, the Council enabled ruling elites to gather information about human 
rights violations in the country, about oppositional elites’ and activists’ demands in this 
policy area, and about possible ways of addressing the grievances. Second, the PCHR 
could be used as an instrument to co-opt both pro-regime and oppositional elites by 
granting them a seat in the president’s advisory council. Third, the PCHR arguably also 
helped co-opt the Russian mass public by highlighting the president’s commitment to 
human rights and by showcasing the support he enjoyed even among widely respected 
oppositional figures.
With regard to the Internet vote scrutinized in this study, four groups of actors involved 
in this participatory undertaking can be distinguished, with whom Russia’s ruling elites 
were thus potentially able to ‘manage their relations’ (Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015: 280): 
(1) pro-regime elites and (2) oppositional elites as members of the Council, (3) highly 
politically engaged citizens who could be expected to participate as voters and (4) the 
mass public who followed the Internet vote exclusively through the country’s main-
stream, elite-controlled mass media. Drawing on the analytical framework laid out in the 
previous pages, the findings of the case study are presented in the following as responses 
to three more narrowly specified research questions: Did the introduction and the design 
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of the Internet vote serve the aims of Russia’s ruling elites, and, if so, then how (RQ1)? 
Did the implementation of the Internet vote serve Russia’s ruling elites, and, if so, then 
how (RQ2)? And did the narrative disseminated by mainstream elite-controlled media 
serve Russia’s ruling elites, and, if so, then how (RQ3)?
Methods of data collection and analysis
RQ1 and RQ2 require reconstruction of the motives, opportunities, and actions of the 
key political actors involved in the Internet vote over time. To accomplish this task, the 
case analysis draws on a wide range of documentary sources, including government 
documents, reports authored by both Western and Russian experts, news media articles 
and social media accounts of participants. Within the semi-controlled Russian media 
environment (cf. Oates, 2013; Renz and Sullivan, 2013; Toepfl, 2011), particularly niche 
oppositional media and social media, albeit reaching only very small audiences, facili-
tated the relatively unhampered dissemination of a wealth of real-time commentary from 
the political leadership, oppositional activists, experts and anonymous informants within 
the Kremlin. These publicly available data were complemented by information gener-
ated in in-depth interviews with four key participants in the events (oppositional activ-
ists) and two Russian experts.1 The aim of data collection was thus to consider the widest 
available range of sources and then ‘triangulate’ the data obtained on the two research 
questions in order to develop ‘converging lines of inquiry’ (‘data triangulation’, Yin, 
2014: 122; for a detailed description of the research procedures adopted, see the Online 
Supplementary File).
RQ3 required the reconstruction of the narrative about the Internet vote as it reached 
the Russian ‘mass public’ (Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015: 280). A key feature of the Russian 
semi-controlled media landscape, at the time of this research, was that it could be divided 
into at least two spheres: (1) a powerful sphere of elite-controlled official media, spear-
headed by the three leading national TV channels, First Channel, NTV, and Rossiya 1, 
and (2) a marginalized sphere of oppositional mass and social media (see Oates, 2013; 
Toepfl, 2011, 2012, in press). In the first sphere of elite-controlled media, news was 
produced in close alignment with Russia’s ruling elites, with weekly strategic meetings 
between Kremlin staff and leading editors being reported (Bykhovskaya, 2011). 
Individual stories could be dropped immediately, according to journalists working in 
these media outlets, in response to phone calls from the presidential administration 
(Bykhovskaya, 2011). By contrast, Internet content in Russia was not systematically 
filtered, in sharp contrast to that in China (Oates, 2013). Regime-critical information was 
thus freely accessible online. Yet, official mass media were overwhelmingly dominant 
with regard to audience reach. In June 2012, for instance, 71% of Russians said in a poll 
that they relied primarily on elite-controlled national TV channels for obtaining their 
news (Levada, 2014: 123). By comparison, only 16% said they relied primarily on the 
Internet, and only approximately 1% said they relied primarily on private newspapers or 
the radio (Levada, 2014: 123). The radio station ‘Echo Moscow’, for instance, a flagship 
outlet of the marginalized sphere of regime-critical oppositional media, had a weekly 
audience of only 5% of citizens (Echo Moscow, 2015). The oppositional TV channel 
Dozhd was only followed by 2% (Levada, 2014: 125).
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In order to establish what the ‘mass public’ (Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015: 280) was most 
likely to learn about the Internet vote, the analysis aims to reconstruct the narrative and 
facts about the event as they were presented on the three leading elite-controlled TV 
channels, which were used by approximately 71% of Russian citizens as their primary 
source of news. To conduct this analysis, all news broadcasts about the Internet vote 
aired on First Channel’s main news programme Vremya were identified via keyword 
searches (‘Council’ and ‘Human Rights’) on the channel’s website, where a complete 
database of the transcripts of all the broadcasts is available. Similar keyword searches 
were carried out on the websites of the two other leading elite-controlled TV channels, 
NTV and Rossiya 1, where, however, not all items broadcast are published. This resulted 
in a corpus of approximately 30 news broadcasts, typically of between 30 seconds and 
6 minutes in length. From this corpus, the basic narratives presented below were recon-
structed in an iterative process of close reading and re-reading.
Findings
How the introduction of the Internet vote served Russia’s ruling elites
Within Russia’s consultative authoritarian regime, the PCHR served Russia’s ruling 
elites in pursuit of a number of critical tasks (see above). These gains were, however, 
imperilled in early 2012, when 11 of the 38 council members resigned from the Council, 
with many of the dropouts saying they left in protest against the new laws that the 
Kremlin was pushing through to curb the street protests (Gazeta.ru, 8 June 20121). 
Approximately a dozen new members needed to be recruited. However, appointing 
activists to the PCHR had always been a highly delicate task for the Kremlin, even in 
more favourable political climates, for at least two reasons: (1) oppositional activists 
could publicly reject an official invitation by the president, and (2) oppositional activists 
already serving on the Council could resign in protest if specific pro-regime figures were 
appointed (cf. Alexeyeva, 2015, personal communication). Therefore, the intricate task 
of recruiting new members had traditionally been performed by the Council’s chairman 
in a series of informal, non-public negotiations with members of the Council, officials in 
the Presidential Administration and potential candidates (Krivenko, 2015, personal com-
munication; Vedomosti, 22 June 2012). It was this prior recruitment procedure that, in 
June 2012, the Kremlin decided to substitute with a new participatory mechanism: an 
‘Internet vote’ (Vedomosti, 22 June 2012). The official rationale for this decision, as 
provided by the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Vyacheslav Volodin, was 
that ‘more democratic mechanisms’, not ‘secret consultations’, were necessary to form 
the Council (Kommersant, 23 June 2012; Izvestiya, 22 June 2012a). The recruitment of 
new members to the PCHR was meant to become more ‘contemporary, public, transpar-
ent, and modern’ (Kommersant, 23 June 2012).
Immediately after the Kremlin’s plans were announced, however, oppositional elites 
in the Council began to publicly campaign against the vote. A group of four prominent 
council members resigned with reference to the new ‘quasi-democratic selection rules’ 
(Gazeta.ru, 26 June 2012; Echo Moscow, 26 June 2012). The group was headed by one 
of Russia’s most prominent oppositional activists, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, aged 85 years, a 
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veteran of the Soviet dissident movement and co-founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group. 
Opposition also came from the Council’s chairman, Mikhail Fedotov, who publicly 
stated that ‘the Russian soccer team was not selected by such a democratic procedure 
either’ (Echo Moscow, 22 June 2012). The rationale behind the resistance of oppositional 
elites was obvious: They were convinced that any type of Internet vote implemented 
under the supervision of the Kremlin would be widely open to manipulation and would, 
beyond any doubt, be exploited by the Kremlin in order to pursue strategic aims 
(Alexeyeva, 2015, personal communication; Echo Moscow, 22 June 2012). From the 
very beginning, oppositional council members reckoned that the introduction of the 
‘Internet vote’ was primarily directed at curbing their influence on the selection of new 
members (Krivenko, 2015, personal communication; Alexeyeva, 2015, personal com-
munication). Despite these initial protests, however, chairman Fedotov soon gave up his 
opposition after rumours had spread that the Kremlin was considering removing him 
from office (Echo Moscow, 27 June 2012; Echo Moscow, 28 June 2012).
On the Council’s website (PCHR, 2012a), the design of the new participatory mecha-
nism, agreed upon between Fedotov and the Kremlin, was later presented as follows, in 
five stages:
1. Nominating candidates. Within a time period of 30 days, potential candidates are 
nominated by, among others, NGOs and council members through the Council’s 
website.
2. Shortlisting candidates. From these nominations, a working group in the Council 
selects a list of candidates allowed to run in the vote, based on their meeting the 
‘requirements’ for the position.
3. Voting. Within a 15-day period, Internet users can cast up to one anonymous vote 
for each candidate, with results updated on the website in real time.
4. Reporting results. The Council chairman reports the results to the president and 
recommends at least three candidates for each vacant position.
5. Appointment of candidates by the president. No rules specified.
At least four points can be concluded from this brief analysis of the introduction and 
design of the Internet vote. First, the Kremlin had to push through the Internet vote 
against the resolute resistance of oppositional elites serving on the Council who feared 
losing their influence on selecting new members. Second, the Kremlin succeeded in 
pushing through an easily malleable participatory design; most importantly, the par-
ticipatory rules specified no safeguards to guarantee effective and independent moni-
toring of the vote. Third, the Kremlin managed to introduce this type of participatory 
tool without prompting a mass exodus of members from the Council or a consistent 
boycott of the vote by oppositional elites. Fourth, the Kremlin obviously accomplished 
these successes by granting a small number of formal concessions to oppositional 
council members, according to which the latter retained at least some influence on the 
selection of new council members (cf. Krivenko, 2015, personal communication). 
Most notably, in Stage 2, sitting council members were empowered to reject nominated 
candidates, and, in Stage 4, the chairman was not formally obliged to align his list of 
recommended candidates with the results of the vote. The next section probes the 
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degree to which these formal concessions were later hewn by the Kremlin in imple-
menting the Internet vote.
How the implementation of the Internet vote served the Kremlin
As envisaged in Stage 1 of the participatory design, 189 candidates were proposed 
through the Council’s website between 15 July and 15 August 2012 (Izvestiya, 16 July 
2012). Of these 189 candidates, a working group of sitting council members then selected 
83 candidates to be shortlisted and included in the Internet vote. These decisions had to 
be made, as vaguely formulated in the participatory rules, based on the candidates meet-
ing not-further-specified ‘requirements’ (trebovaniya) for specific issue areas (PCHR, 
2012a; Izvestiya, 27 August 2012). The shortlist presented by the Council triggered a 
heated public controversy, with some candidates complaining that they had been rejected 
for personal reasons. One rejected candidate, Aleksandr Brod, even declared a hunger 
strike (Izvestiya, 3 September 2012). Yet, the shortlist composed by the council members 
remained largely unchanged.
Entering into Stage 3, the Internet vote was conducted between 1 and 15 September 
2012. It was implemented and supervised by the Kremlin via the state-owned news 
agency RIA Novosti (Golos, 2012). Through a voting tool embedded into the official 
website of the PCHR, each Internet user was entitled to support each of the 83 candidates 
with up to one vote (PCHR, 2012c). According to official data, 108,000 citizens partici-
pated and cast 420,000 votes (PCHR, 2012d). To prevent users from voting twice for a 
candidate, the tool registered their IP addresses and saved cookies into their browsers. 
Access to the corresponding log files, however, was not granted to independent monitor-
ing organizations (Udot, 2015, personal communication). Most notably, the voting tool 
did not provide a real-time count of the absolute number of votes cast for each candidate. 
By contrast, it showed only the real-time percentage values of the votes that each candi-
date had allegedly received (PCHR, 2012b). This was a key weakness of the tool, as 
Roman Udot (2015, personal communication), an expert who observed the vote for the 
Russian election monitoring NGO Golos, argued. The absence of real-time, absolute 
vote-counts afforded the Kremlin with close to unlimited opportunities to manipulate the 
vote’s outcome.
Given the regime’s widely known track record of manipulating traditional offline elec-
tions (Oates, 2013; Shevtsova, 2015), it appeared common sense and beyond any doubt to 
the members of the Russian opposition that the Kremlin would not hesitate to also rig the 
Internet vote in order to pursue its strategic goals (Alexeyeva, 2015, personal communica-
tion; Krivenko, 2015, personal communication). Most straightforwardly, the Kremlin’s 
webmasters would have had the opportunity to simulate the slight movement of percent-
age values for each candidate, without even taking the votes cast by netizens into account. 
Even if they had committed this most straightforward type of electoral fraud, Russia’s 
oppositional forces would have had no chance to uncover the manipulations (Udot, 2015, 
personal communication). The only means of monitoring the vote available to Golos was 
to systematically harvest data from the front end of the voting platform, that is, to trace 
shifts in the percentage values shown for candidates minute by minute. These data pro-
vide, for instance, evidence that the vote count of a Kremlin-friendly candidate that had 
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been fluctuating around 37% for several days leapt to a winning 43% within only 2 hours 
on the last day of the vote (Novaya Gazeta, 1 October 2012). As Golos observer Udot 
(2015, personal communication) notes, this may not be conclusive proof of manipulation. 
Yet, observing such a massive leap on the basis of real voter behaviour was as likely as 
‘winning the lottery ten times in a row’ (Udot, 2015, personal communication).
In Stage 4, Chairman Fedotov was supposed to prepare a ‘report’ for the president 
about the results of the vote. According to Fedotov’s own account, a conflict soon 
emerged again between him and the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, 
Vyacheslav Volodin (Izvestiya, 25 October 2012). While Fedotov intended to submit a 
list of candidates who he personally recommended, Volodin insisted that Fedotov hand 
over to the president a document labelled as a briefing (informatsiya) that simply repro-
duced the most-voted-for candidates (Izvestiya, 25 October 2012; Krivenko, 2015, per-
sonal communication). Ultimately, Fedotov also had to back down in this respect. He 
handed over a list with the 39 most-voted-for candidates to President Putin. In addition, 
he recommended eight further candidates (Gazeta.ru, 8 November 2012), but none of his 
eight suggestions was accepted by the president. By contrast, President Putin decided, 
allegedly ‘spontaneously’, to appoint all 39 candidates on Fedotov’s electoral list and 
expand the PCHR from 40 to more than 60 seats (First Channel, 1 November 2012; NTV, 
1 November 2012; Rossiya 1, 1 November 2012). Two weeks later, Putin even appointed 
Aleksandr Brod to the Council, an activist who had been most fiercely rejected and 
excluded from the vote by the sitting council members in Stage 2, because he had embez-
zled grant money in one of his projects (Echo Moscow, 17 November 2012; Alexeyeva, 
2015, personal communication).
From this in-depth analysis of the implementation of the Internet vote, four conclu-
sions can be drawn. First, the Kremlin implemented a voting tool that simulated transpar-
ency by logging users’ IP addresses and publishing real-time percentage results. Yet, de 
facto, the tool posed virtually no limits to the manipulation of the vote’s outcome by the 
Kremlin, while it offered close to no opportunities for oppositional forces to reveal 
potential manipulations. Second, the Kremlin did not act upon the vaguely formulated 
concessions made to oppositional elites in the agreed-upon participatory rules. Third, the 
Kremlin consistently justified its disregard of oppositional elites’ recommendations by 
pointing to the results of the quasi-democratic and transparent Internet vote. To summa-
rize, with the introduction of the Internet vote, oppositional elites lost – as they had 
feared from the very beginning – virtually all influence on the selection of new council 
members.
How the narrative disseminated by elite-controlled TV served ruling elites
What did ordinary Russians learn about the Internet vote from the country’s three leading 
elite-controlled TV channels? As a qualitative analysis of the news coverage of these 
channels reveals, the Internet vote was put on the news agenda by the three elite-con-
trolled channels mainly on four occasions. On those four occasions, the narrative dissemi-
nated about the vote by the three TV channels scarcely featured any differences, but ran 
broadly parallel. The first time that the Internet vote made it into the official news was on 
22 June 2012. On this day, Russia’s elite-controlled TV presented the council chairman, 
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Fedotov, as the author of the idea that the Council should be formed in the future in 
accordance with ‘new principles’, that is, based on an Internet vote (First Channel, 22 
June 2012; see also NTV, 22 June 2012; Rossiya 1, 22 June 2012). By contrast, Fedotov’s 
and other council members’ fierce protest against the introduction of the vote was not 
mentioned. Likewise, the reasons why new members needed to be appointed to the 
Council were omitted (see, for instance, NTV, 22 June 2012; Rossiya 1, 22 June 2012).
A further occasion that the Internet vote made it on the official news agenda was on 1 
November 2012. In the news broadcast that day (see, for instance, First Channel, 1 
November 2012), Chairman Fedotov was shown handing over a report to President 
Putin. As the voiceover on First Channel (1 November 2012) explained, Fedotov was, at 
that moment, recommending to the president the most popular new candidates for the 
Council as they emerged from an Internet vote. Fedotov’s resistance to submitting this 
purely electoral list and his failed attempt to suggest alternative candidates were not 
mentioned. By contrast, as the voiceover on First Channel announced (1 November 
2012), Fedotov found it hard to choose between even the three most successful candi-
dates in the Internet vote, since all of them appeared ‘worthy’. President Putin, however, 
solved this problem by suggesting the appointment of all 39 candidates on the list, since 
these, as Putin explained to the TV audience, ‘are the people voted by the majority of 
Internet users, independently of whether certain people in the administrative-executive 
state organs may like them or not’.
To summarize, the coverage of Russia’s state TV channel portrayed (1) council mem-
bers as the initiators of the Internet vote while not mentioning their resolute resistance, 
(2) Russia’s ruling elites as largely passive observers while not explicating their central 
role in shaping and implementing the vote, (3) the voting mechanism as highly transpar-
ent and secure while not touching upon its weaknesses, and (4) rank-and-file activists as 
highly empowered voters who created and legitimized the new Council while being 
silent about potential manipulations. In a nutshell, the TV narrative served the purposes 
of Russia’s ruling elites by systematically overstating the participatory influence of 
oppositional elites and ordinary activists while consistently downplaying the decisive 
role of the Kremlin.
Discussion
The case study from Russia presented in this article was the first to investigate the com-
plex ways in which Internet votes to staff advisory bodies – as allegedly inherently demo-
cratic participatory mechanisms – can be swiftly deployed by authoritarian elites to further 
their strategic goals. In order to do so, the study placed under close scrutiny the first such 
Internet vote held in Russia in 2012 aimed at appointing new members to the PCHR.
The Internet vote to the PCHR: empowering citizens or power-holders?
As demonstrated in the case analysis, the Internet vote, as it was implemented, featured 
three key characteristics. First, it posed close to no limits for Kremlin staff to manipulate 
its results. Second, it offered virtually no opportunities for oppositional forces to reveal 
potential manipulations. Third, the vote could be implemented in a socio-political context 
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in which mainstream mass media did not critically interrogate the entire participatory 
undertaking, but consensually disseminated a narrative about the event that exclusively 
served the strategic goals of Russia’s power-holders. As a consequence, from the perspec-
tive of ruling elites, introducing an Internet vote as an additional participatory mechanism 
came with virtually no risks, but offered a variety of opportunities to swiftly optimize their 
relationships with different segments of the population (He and Warren, 2011; Lagacé and 
Gandhi, 2015; Truex, 2014).
As Lagacé and Gandhi (2015) have argued, authoritarian elites can establish partici-
patory institutions in order to ‘manage their relations’ (p. 280) with four groups of actors: 
(1) pro-regime elites, (2) oppositional elites, (3) ordinary citizens opposing the regime, 
and (4) the mass public. These four key groups were also involved in the Internet vote to 
the PCHR: (1) regime-loyal and (2) oppositional elites as sitting and prospective mem-
bers of the Council, (3) highly politically engaged citizens as voters, and (4) a mass 
public who followed the vote exclusively through elite-controlled media. By comparison 
with the previous selection procedure of informal negotiations, Russia’s ruling elites 
were able to tweak their relationships with primarily two of these groups: oppositional 
elites and the mass public. As the in-depth analysis demonstrated, the Internet vote ena-
bled Russia’s ruling elites to deprive oppositional elites of virtually all their previous 
influence on recruiting new members. Moreover, the Russian mass public, who learnt 
about the entire participatory undertaking exclusively from elite-controlled media, could 
be presented with a sophistically tailored narrative about the event that unambiguously 
bolstered the legitimacy of ruling elites.
By contrast, it is disputable whether the Internet vote also helped Russia’s ruling elites 
to increase their legitimacy within the third group, that is, among the 108,000 citizens 
who actually participated in the vote (PCHR, 2012). Within the semi-controlled Russian 
media environment, the overwhelming majority of these politically engaged citizens, 
who followed the Council’s work actively, were most likely also following the coverage 
of oppositional mass media (Oates, 2013; Toepfl, 2011). Russia’s oppositional media, 
however, as the sources cited in the case analysis vividly illustrate, covered the Internet 
vote in a highly critical manner, also decrying the hypocritical role that the Kremlin took 
on as a behind-the-scenes manager of the vote (Novaya Gazeta, 1 October 2013). Against 
this backdrop, some Russian experts even argued that the Internet vote as a participatory 
tactic was directed by the Kremlin – somewhat paradoxically – not primarily at partici-
pants but at non-participants (Stechkin, 2015, personal communication; Novaya Gazeta, 
1 October 2013). According to this very plausible line of argument, by implementing the 
Internet vote, Russia’s ruling elites aimed to increase their legitimacy not primarily 
among the 108,000 netizens who voted online, but among the more than hundred times 
larger mass public of tens of millions of citizens, who learnt about the entire undertaking 
exclusively from elite-controlled TV.
Expanding the repertoire of digital participatory tools of authoritarian 
leaders
Extant research on the consequences of the Internet for politics has largely focused on 
how oppositional activists leverage new digital tools to challenge authoritarian rule 
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(Greitens, 2013; Gunitsky, 2015; Oates, 2013; Pearce, 2015). However, with the rise of 
the Internet, in parallel to a new ‘digital repertoire of contention’ (Earl and Kimport, 
2011: 177) adopted by activists, a new repertoire of digital participatory tools deployed 
by authoritarian elites also appears to have emerged. Within this repertoire, the Internet 
votes exemplified in this article can be considered a recent innovation. How do Internet 
votes compare with previously studied types of participatory tools, such as, for instance, 
online spaces that invite citizens to monitor lower-level officials (Jiang and Xu, 2009; 
Noesselt, 2014; Toepfl, 2012), to deliberate on planned policies (Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang, 
2010), or to voice their preferences on specific issues? (Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang and Xu, 
2009: 186). As has been argued in the literature on authoritarian institutions (He and 
Warren, 2011; Lagacé and Gandhi, 2015; Nathan, 2003; Truex, 2014), authoritarian 
elites can make use of such input institutions in order to pursue different goals, including 
(1) co-opting oppositional and pro-regime elites, (2) gathering information about society, 
(3) opening up forums for exchange with elites, (4) credibly increasing transparency of 
government, and (5) deflecting responsibility for unpopular decisions. By comparison 
with previously studied participatory tools like online petitions or deliberative forums, 
Internet votes appear to be particularly well suited, as the case analysis has evidenced, to 
facilitate the co-optation of oppositional and pro-regime elites (goal 1) and the creation 
and management of offline forums for exchange with elites (goal 3). These goals appear 
to not be currently pursued by authoritarian elites by means of online petitions or virtual 
deliberative forums (Balla, 2014; Balla and Liao, 2013; Gunitsky, 2015; Jiang, 2010; 
Jiang and Xu, 2009).
To our knowledge, Russia has remained the only authoritarian regime within which 
political elites have adopted Internet votes as a novel participatory tactic. By contrast, 
within China’s more closed polity, nationwide voting enabled by ICTs was banned in 
2007 in order to curb the success of the TV talent show Super Girl. According to Wu 
(2014), such ‘an unprecedented emphasis on the voting power of everyday people, … 
lacking in the formal political sphere, alarmed the state’ (110). In the Arab world, similar 
reality TV shows that have featured electoral elements remained on the air despite mani-
fold public controversies around their alleged democratic potential (Kraidy, 2009). Yet, 
Arab authoritarian leaders have apparently not proactively adopted Internet votes as a 
participatory tactic.
Why did Internet votes as a novel tactic of consultative authoritarian rule emerge 
specifically in Russia? At least two characteristics of Russia’s semi-authoritarian regime 
appear to be highly conducive. First, in sharp contrast to China and many Arab countries, 
Russia has held semi-competitive elections for both the national parliament and the pres-
idency since the early 1990s (Levitsky and Way, 2010). An additional flurry of semi-
competitive Internet votes to fill advisory bodies to the government was thus, apparently, 
not perceived as a major threat by Russia’s consultative authoritarian leadership. Second, 
not only Russia’s political regime but also its media landscape was relatively open in 
comparison with other authoritarian states. Most importantly, unlike its Chinese counter-
part, the Russian Internet was not subject to large-scale, systematic filtering for key-
words. On the Russian Internet, online votes similar to that for the PCHR had already 
been conducted by opposition groups to choose speakers at protest meetings and mem-
bers of a so-called ‘Coordination Council of the Opposition’ (in press). Internet votes as 
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a participatory tool were thus a widely adopted tool, not only in the realm of TV enter-
tainment, as in the Arab world (Kraidy, 2009), but even in politics in a narrow sense, that 
is, as a tactic in the ‘digital repertoire of contention’ (Earl and Kimport, 2011: 177) of 
oppositional groups.
Promising avenues for future research
Extant research on new online participatory tools adopted by authoritarian governments 
has largely been grounded in content analyses of the newly opened participatory spaces 
(cf. Balla and Liao, 2013; Jiang and Xu, 2009), surveys conducted among participants 
(Balla, 2012, 2014), and survey experiments (Truex, 2014). By contrast, this study has 
drawn on extensive document analysis and interviews with key actors in order to accom-
plish an in-depth case study of the power struggle over the design and implementation of 
one such participatory tool. The analysis presented in this article has thus widened the 
focus of data collection beyond the content posted on the project websites and data 
gained from ordinary participants. This was crucial to generating an in-depth under-
standing of the participatory tool scrutinized here, since, as has been argued, the approxi-
mately 108,000 Russian citizens who participated as voters may not even have been the 
primary political target group at which the entire undertaking was directed (see above). 
Against this backdrop, the first promising avenue for future research is that of adopting 
a similar case study approach to scrutinizing participatory tools other than Internet votes 
(Gunitsky, 2015; Truex, 2014). Why, how, and with what political consequences are dif-
ferent types of online participatory spaces being opened up by political elites in distinct 
types of authoritarian regimes? Second, this study was the first to investigate the role of 
Internet votes as a specific type of new participatory mechanism. It would be fascinating 
to explore, in-depth, whether – and if so, how – authoritarian elites elsewhere are exploit-
ing this seemingly inherently democratic tool to stabilize their rule and innovate consul-
tative authoritarianism.
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